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Abstract
We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the
lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of rationality
within a complete information framework if and only if there is a belief hierarchy within the corresponding incomplete information
framework that expresses common full belief in caution, rationality, every good choice is supported, and prior belief in the original
utility functions.
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1. Introduction
Assumption of rationality is a concept in epistemic game the-
ory introduced by Brandenburger et al. Brandenburger et al.
(2008) and studied in Perea Perea (2012) by using lexico-
graphic belief. A lexicographic belief is said to assume the op-
ponents’ rationality means that a “good” choice always occurs
in front of a “bad” one. Here by good we mean a choice of the
opponent can be supported by a cautious belief of him, that is,
a belief that does not exclude any choice of the opponents; by
bad we mean it cannot be supported by any such belief.
Like other concepts in epistemic game theory such as per-
missibility (Brandenburger Brandenburger (1992)) and proper
rationalizability (Schuhmacher Schuhmacher (1999), Ascheim
Asheim (2001)), iterative admissibility is defined partly to al-
leviate the tension between caution and rationality (Blume et al.
Blume et al. (1991), Brandenburger Brandenburger (1992),
Bo¨rgers Bo¨rgers (1994), Samuelson Samuelson (1992),
Bo¨rgers and Samuelson Bo¨rgers and Samuelson (1992)) by
sacrificing rationality. Caution requires that every choice, be
it rational or not, should appear in a belief; assumption of ratio-
nality only requires that those rational choices should occur in
front of those irrational ones but cannot exclude the irrational
ones. On the other hand, since rationality is a basic assumption
on human behavior in game theory, it seems desirable to find
an approach to have a “complete” rationality while to keep the
definition of iterative admissibility.
One approach is to use an incomplete information framework
introduced by Perea and Roy Perea and Roy (2017) which de-
fined standard probabilistic epistemic model with incomplete
information and used it to characterized ε-proper rationaliz-
ability. Following their approach, Liu Liu (2017) defined lexi-
cographic epistemic models with incomplete information, con-
structed a mapping between them and models with complete in-
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formation, and characterized permissibility and proper rational-
izability. In this paper, we still use the construction in Liu Liu
(2017) and characterize assumption of rationality. We show that
a choice is optimal for a belief hierarchy which expresses com-
mon assumption of rationality within a complete information
framework if and only if it is optimal for a belief hierarchy
within the corresponding incomplete information framework
that expresses common full belief in caution, rationality, every
good choice is supported, and prior belief in the original utility
functions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a survey
of assumption of rationality in epistemic models with complete
information and the lexicographic epistemic models with in-
complete information. Section 3 gives the characterization re-
sult and their proofs. Section 4 gives some concluding remarks
on the relationship between the result of this paper and charac-
terization of permissbility in Section 4.6 of Liu Liu (2017).
2. Models
2.1. Complete information model
In this subsection, we give a survey of lexicographic epis-
temic model with complete information and define iterative
admissibility within it. We adopt the approach of Perea
Perea (2012), Chapters 5 and 7. See Brandenburger et al.
Brandenburger et al. (2008) for an alternative approach.
Consider a finite 2-person static game Γ = (Ci, ui)i∈I where
I = {1, 2} is the set of players, Ci is the finite set of choices and
ui : C1 × C2 → R is the utility function for player i ∈ I. In
the following we sometimes denote C1 × C2 by C. We assume
that each player has a lexicographic belief on the opponent’s
choices, a lexicographic belief on the opponent’s lexicographic
belief on her, and so on. This belief hierarchy is described by a
lexicographic epistemic model with types.
Definition 2.1 (Epistemic model with complete information).
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Consider a finite 2-person static game Γ = (Ci, ui)i∈I . A finite
lexicographic epistemic model for Γ is a tuple Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I
where
(a) Ti is a finite set of types, and
(b) bi is a mapping that assigns to each ti ∈ Ti a lexicographic
belief over ∆(C j × T j), i.e., bi(ti) = (bi1, bi2, ..., biK) where bik ∈
∆(C j × T j) for k = 1, ...,K.
Consider ti ∈ Ti with bi(ti) = (bi1, bi2, ..., biK). Each bik (k =
1, ...,K) is called ti’s level-k belief. For each (c j, t j) ∈ C j × T j,
we say ti deems (c j, t j) possible iff bik(c j, t j) > 0 for some k ∈
{1, ...,K}. We say ti deems t j ∈ T j possible iff ti deems (c j, t j)
possible for some c j ∈ C j. For each ti ∈ Ti, we denote by T j(ti)
the set of types in T j deemed possible by ti. A type ti ∈ Ti is
cautious iff for each c j ∈ C j and each t j ∈ T j(ti), ti deems (c j, t j)
possible. That is, ti takes into account each choice of player j
for every belief hierarchy of j deemed possible by ti.
For each ci ∈ Ci, let ui(ci, ti) = (ui(ci, bi1)., .., ui(ci, biK))
where for each k = 1, ...,K, ui(ci, bik) :=
Σ(c j ,t j)∈C j×T jbik(c j, t j)ui(ci, c j), that is, each ui(ci, bik) is the
expected utility for ci over bik and ui(ci, ti) is a vector of
expected utilities. For each ci, c
′
i
∈ Ci, we say that ti prefers ci
to c′
i
, denoted by ui(ci, ti) > ui(c
′
i
, ti), iff there is k ∈ {0, ...,K−1}
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) ui(ci, biℓ) = ui(c
′
i
, biℓ) for ℓ = 0, ..., k, and
(b) ui(ci, bi,k+1) > ui(c
′
i
, bi,k+1).
We say that ti is indifferent between ci and c
′
i
, denoted
by ui(ci, ti) = ui(c
′
i
, ti), iff ui(ci, bik) = ui(c
′
i
, bik) for each
k = 1, ...,K. It can be seen that the preference relation on Ci
under each type ti is a linear order. ci is rational (or optimal)
for ti iff ti does not prefer any choice to ci.
For (c j, t j), (c
′
j
, t′
j
) ∈ C j × T j, we say that ti deems (c j, t j) in-
finitely more likely than (c′
j
, t′
j
) iff there is k ∈ {0, ...,K − 1} such
that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(a) biℓ(c j, t j) = biℓ(c
′
j
, t′
j
) = 0 for ℓ = 1, ..., k, and
(b) bi,k+1(c j, t j) > 0 and bi,k+1(c
′
j
, t′
j
) = 0.
Definition 2.2 (Assumption of rationality) A cautious type
ti ∈ Ti assumes the j’s rationality iff the following two con-
ditions are satisfied:
(A1) for all of player j’s choices c j that are optimal for some
cautious belief, ti deems possible some type t j for which c j is
optimal;
(A2) ti deems all choice-type pairs (c j, t j) where t j is cautious
and c j is optimal for t j infinitely more likely than any choice-
type pairs (c′
j
, t′
j
) that does not have this property.
Informally speaking, assumption of the opponent’s rational-
ity is that ti puts all “good” choices in front of those “bad”
choices.The following definition extends assumption of ratio-
nality inductively into n-fold for any n ∈ N.
Definition 2.3 (n-fold assumption of rationality) Consider a
finite lexicographic epistemic model Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I for a
game Γ = (Ci, ui)i∈I . A cautious type ti ∈ Ti expresses 1-fold
assumption of rationality iff it assumes j’s rationality. For any
n ∈ N, we say that a cautious type ti ∈ Ti expresses (n + 1)-fold
assumption of rationality iff the following two conditions are
satisfied:
(nA1)whenever a choice c j of player j is optimal for some cau-
tious type (not necessarily in Mco) that expresses up to n-fold
assumption of rationality, ti deems possible some cautious type
t j for player j which expresses up to n-fold assumption of ra-
tionality for which c j is optimal;
(nA2) ti deems all choice-type pair (c j, t j), where t j is cautious
and expresses up to n-fold assumption of rationality and c j is
optimal for t j, infinitely more likely than any choice-type pairs
(c′
j
, t′
j
) that does not satisfy this property.
We say that ti expresses common assumption of rationality iff
it expresses n-fold assumption of rationality for every n ∈ N.
2.2. Incomplete information model
In this subsection, we give a survey of lexicographic
epistemic model with incomplete information defined in
Liu Liu (2017) which is the counterpart of the proba-
bilistic epistemic model with incomplete information intro-
duced by Battigalli Battigalli (2003) and further developed
in Battigalli and Siniscalchi Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003),
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2007), and Dekel and Siniscalchi
Dekel and Siniscalchi (2015). We also define some conditions
on types in such a model.
Definition 2.4 (Lexicographic epistemic model with incom-
plete information). Consider a finite 2-person static game form
G = (Ci)i∈I . For each i ∈ I, let Vi be the set of utility functions
vi : C1 × C2 → R. A finite lexicographic epistemic model for
G with incomplete information is a tuple Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I
where
(a) Θi is a finite set of types,
(b) wi is a mapping that assigns to each θi ∈ Θi a utility function
wi(θi) ∈ Vi, and
(c) βi is a mapping that assigns to each θi ∈ Θi a lexicographic
belief over ∆(C j × Θ j), i.e., βi(θi) = (βi1, βi2, ..., βiK) where
βik ∈ ∆(C j × Θ j) for k = 1, ...,K.
Concepts such as “θi deems (c j, θ j) possible” and “θi deems
(c j, θ j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j
, θ′
j
)” can be defined in a
similar way as in Section 2.1. For each θi ∈ Θi, we use Θ j(θi)
to denote the set of types in Θ j deemed possible by θi. For each
θi ∈ Θi and vi ∈ Vi, θ
vi
i
is the auxiliary type satisfying that
βi(θ
vi
i
) = βi(θi) and wi(θ
vi
i
) = vi.
For each ci ∈ Ci, vi ∈ Vi, and θi ∈ Θi
with βi(θi) = (βi1, βi2, ..., βiK), let vi(ci, θi) =
(vi(ci, βi1), ..., vi(ci, βiK)) where for each k = 1, ...,K,
vi(ci, βik) := Σ(c j ,θ j)∈C j×Θ jβik(c j, θ j)vi(ci, c j). For each
ci, c
′
i
∈ Ci and θi ∈ Θi, we say that θi prefers ci to c
′
i
iff
wi(θi)(ci, θi) > wi(θi)(c
′
i
, θi). As in Section 2.1, this is also the
lexicographic comparison between two vectors. ci is rational
(or optimal) for θi iff θi does not prefer any choice to ci.
Definition 2.5 (Caution). θi ∈ Θi is cautious iff for each
c j ∈ C j and each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi), there is some utility function
v j ∈ V j such that θi deems (c j, θ
v j
j
) possible.
This is a faithful translation of Perea and Roy Perea and Roy
(2017)’s definition of caution in probabilistic model (p.312)
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into lexicographic model. It is the counterpart of caution de-
fined within the complete information framework in Section
2.1; the only difference is that in incomplete information mod-
els we allow different utility functions since c j will be required
to be rational for the paired type.
Definition 2.6 (Belief in rationality). θi ∈ Θi believes in j’s
rationality iff θi deems (c j, θ j) possible only if c j is rational for
θ j.
The following lemma shows that caution and a belief of full
rationality can be satisfied simultaneously in an incomplete in-
formation model because each type is assigned with a belief
on the opponent’s choice-type pairs as well as a payoff func-
tion. The consistency of caution and full rationality is the es-
sential difference between models with incomplete information
and those with complete information.
Lemma 2.1 (Belief in rationality can be satisfied). Consider a
static game form G = (Ci)i∈I , C
′
i
∈ Ci, and βi = (βi1, βi2, ..., βiK)
such that βik ∈ ∆(C j) for each k = 1, ...,K. Then there is vi ∈ Vi
such that each ci ∈ C
′
i
is optimal in vi for βi.
Proof. There are various way to construct such a vi. Here we
provide a simple one. For each c ∈ C, let
vi(c) =
{
1 if ci ∈ C
′
i
and c j ∈ suppβi1;
0 otherwise
It can be seen that each ci ∈ C
′
i
is optimal in vi for βi. //
Caution and belief in rationality can be extended into k-fold
for any k ∈ N as follows. Let P be an arbitrary property of
lexicographic beliefs. We define that
(CP1) θi ∈ Θ expresses 0-fold full belief in P iff θi satisfies P;
(CP2) For each n ∈ N with n ≥ 2, θi ∈ Ti expresses n-fold
full belief in P iff θi only deems possible j’s types that express
n-fold full belief in P.
θi expresses common full belief in P iff it expresses n-fold
full belief in P for each n ∈ N. By replacing P with “caution”
or “rationality” we can obtain common full belief in caution or
in rationality.
The following two conditions are important in characterizing
assumption of rationality.
Definition 2.7 (Every good choice is supported). Consider a
static game form G = (Ci)i∈I , a lexicographic epistemic model
Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I for G with incomplete information, and a
pair u = (ui)i∈I of utility functions. A cautious type θi ∈ Θi
believes in that every good choice of j is supported iff for each
c j that is optimal for some cautious type of j (may not be in
Min) with u j as its assigned utility function, θi deems possible
a cautious type θ j ∈ Θ j such that w j(θ j) = u j and c j is optimal
for θ j.
Definition 2.8 (Prior belief in u). Consider a static game
form G = (Ci)i∈I , a lexicographic epistemic model M
in =
(Θi,wi, βi)i∈I for G with incomplete information, and a pair
u = (ui)i∈I of utility functions. θi ∈ Θi priorly believes in u
iff for any (c j, θ j) with θ j cautious deemed possible by θi sat-
isfying that w j(θ j) = u j, then θi deems (c j, θ j) infinitely more
likely than any pair does not satisfy that property.
Common full belief in that every good choice is supported
and prior belief in u is different from that in caution or rational-
ity. We have the following definition.
Definition 2.9 (n-fold belief in that every good choice is sup-
ported and prior belief in u) Consider a static game formG =
(Ci)i∈I , a lexicographic epistemic model M
in = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I for
G with incomplete information, and a pair u = (ui)i∈I of util-
ity functions. θi ∈ Θi express 1-fold belief in that every good
choice is supported and prior belief in u iff it believes that every
good choice of j is supported and has prior belief in u. For any
n ∈ N, we say that a cautious type θi ∈ Θi expresses (n+ 1)-fold
belief in prior belief in that every good choice is supported and
prior belief in u iff the following two conditions are satisfied:
(nP1)whenever a choice c j of player j is optimal for some cau-
tious type (not necessarily in Min) with u j as its assigned utility
function that expresses up to n-fold belief in that every good
choice is supported, θi deems possible some cautious type θ j
with w j(θ j) = u j for player j which expresses up to n-fold be-
lief in that every good choice is supported and prior belief in u
for which c j is optimal.
(nP2) θi deems all choice-type pair (c j, θ j), where θ j is cautious
and expresses up to n-fold belief in that prior belief in u and
every good choice is supported and satisfies w j(θ j) = u j, in-
finitely more likely than any choice-type pairs (c′
j
, θ′
j
) that does
not satisfy this property.
We say that ti expresses common full belief in that every good
choice is supported and prior belief in u iff it expresses n-fold
belief in that every good choice is supported and prior belief in
u for every n ∈ N.
3. Characterization
So far we have introduced two different groups of concepts
for static games: one includes assumption of rationality within a
complete information framework, the other contains some con-
ditions on types within an incomplete information framework.
In this section we will show that there is correspondence be-
tween them.
Theorem 3.1 (Characterization of iterative admissibility).
Consider a finite 2-person static game Γ = (Ci, ui)i∈I and the
corresponding game form G = (Ci). c
∗
i
∈ Ci is optimal to some
type expressing common full belief in caution and common as-
sumption of rationality within some finite epistemic model with
complete information if and only if there is some finite epis-
temic model Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I with incomplete information
for G and some θ∗
i
∈ Θi with wi(θ
∗
i
) = ui such that
(a) c∗
i
is rational for θ∗
i
, and
(b) θ∗
i
expresses common full belief in caution, rationality, that
every good choice is supported, and prior belief in u.
To show Theorem 3.1, we construct the mappings between
finite lexicographic epistemic models with complete informa-
tion and those with incomplete information. First, consider
Γ = (Ci, ui)i∈I and a finite lexicographic epistemic model M
co =
(Ti, bi)i∈I with complete information for Γ.We first define types
in a model with incomplete information in the following two
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steps:
Step 1. For each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti, let Πi(ti) = (Ci1, ...,CiL)
be the partition of Ci defined in Lemma 2.1, that is, Πi(ti) is
the sequence of equivalence classes of choices in Ci arranged
from the most preferred to the least preferred under ti. We de-
fine viℓ(ti) ∈ Vi for each ℓ = 1, ..., L. We let vi1(ti) = ui. By
Lemma 2.1, for each Ciℓ with ℓ > 1 there is some viℓ(ti) ∈ Vi
such that each choice in Ciℓ is rational at viℓ(ti) under ti.
Step 2. We define Θi(ti) = {θi1(ti), ..., θiL(ti)} where for each
ℓ = 1, ..., L, the type θiℓ(ti) satisfies that (1) wi(θiℓ(ti)) = viℓ(ti),
and (2) βi(θiℓ(ti)) is obtained from bi(ti) by replacing every
(c j, t j) with c j ∈ C jr ∈ Π j(t j) for some r with (c j, θ j) where
θ j = θ jr(t j), that is, w j(θ j) is the utility function among those
corresponding to Π j(t j) in which c j is the rational for ti.
For each i ∈ I, letΘi = ∪ti∈TiΘi(ti). Here we have constructed
a finite lexicographic epistemic model Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I for
the corresponding game form G = (Ci)i∈I with incomplete in-
formation. In the following example we show how this con-
struction goes.
Example 3.2. Consider the following game Γ (Perea Perea
(2012), p.188):
u1\u2 C D
A 1, 0 0, 1
B 0, 0 0, 1
and the lexicographic epistemic modelMco = (Ti, bi)i∈I Γwhere
T1 = {t1}, T2 = {t2}, and
b1(t1) = ((D, t2), (C, t2)), b2(t2) = ((A, t1), (B, t1)).
We show how to construct a corresponding model Min =
(Θi,wi, βi)i∈I . First, by Step 1 it can be seen that Π1(t1) =
({A}, {B}) and Π2(t2) = ({D}, {C}). We let v11(t1) = u1 where
A is rational for t1 and v12(t1) where B is rational for t1 as fol-
lows. Similarly, we let v21(t2) = u2 where D is rational under t2
and v22(t2) where C is rational under t2 as follows:
v12(t1) C D
A 1 0
B 0 1
,
v22(t2) C D
A 2 1
B 0 1
.
Then we go to Step 2. It can be seen that Θ1(t1) =
{θ11(t1), θ12(t1)}, where
w1(θ11(t1)) = v11(t1), β1(θ11(t1)) = ((D, θ21(t2)), (C, θ22(t2))),
w1(θ12(t1)) = v12(t1), β1(θ12(t1)) = ((D, θ21(t2)), (C, θ22(t2))).
Also, Θ2(t2) = {θ21(t2), θ22(t2)}, where
w2(θ21(t2)) = v21(t2), β2(θ21(t2)) = ((A, θ11(t1)), (B, θ12(t1))),
w2(θ22(t2)) = v22(t2), β2(θ22(t2)) = ((A, θ11(t1)), (B, θ12(t1))).
Let Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I and M
in = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I be constructed
from Mco by the two steps above. We have the following obser-
vations.
Observation 3.1 (Redundancy). For each ti ∈ Ti and each
θi, θ
′
i
∈ Θi(ti), βi(θi) = βi(θ
′
i
).
Observation 3.2 (Rationality). Eeach θi ∈ Θi(ti) believes in
j’s rationality.
We omit their proofs since they hold by construction. Obser-
vation 3.1 means that the difference between any two types in a
Θi(ti) is in the utility functions assigned to them. Observation
3.2 means that in an incomplete information model constructed
from one with complete information, each type has (full) belief
in the opponent’s rationality. This is because in the construc-
tion, we requires that for each pair (c j, t j) occurring in a belief,
its counterpart in the incomplete information replaces t j by the
type in Θ j(t j) with the utility function in which c j is optimal
for bi(t j). It follows from Observation 3.2 that each θi ∈ Θi(ti)
expresses common full belief in rationality.
The following lemma shows that caution is preserved in this
construction.
Lemma 3.1 (Cautionco → Cautionin). Let Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I
and Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I be constructed from M
co by the two
steps above. If ti ∈ Ti expresses common full belief in caution,
so does each θi ∈ Θi(ti).
Proof. We show this statement by induction. First we show
that if ti is cautious, then each θi ∈ Θi(ti) is also cautious. Let
c j ∈ C j and θ j ∈ Θ j(θi). By construction, it can be seen that the
type t j ∈ T j satisfying the condition that θ j ∈ Θ j(t j) is in T j(ti).
Since ti is cautious, ti deems (c j, t j) possible. Consider the pair
(c j, θ
′
j
) in βi(θi) corresponding to (c j, t j). Since both θ j and θ
′
j
are
in Θ j(t j), it follows from Observation 3.1 that β j(θ j) = β j(θ
′
j
).
Hence (c j, θ
w j(θ
′
j
)
j
) is deemed possible by θi.Here we have shown
that θi is cautious.
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if ti expresses
n-fold full belief in caution then so does each θi ∈ Θi(ti). Now
suppose that ti expresses (n + 1)-fold full belief in caution, i.e.,
each t j ∈ T j(ti) expresses n-fold full belief in caution. By con-
struction, for each θi ∈ Θi(ti) and each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) there is some
t j ∈ T j(ti) such that θ j ∈ Θ j(ti), and, by inductive assumption,
each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold full belief in caution. There-
fore, each θi ∈ Θi(ti) expresses (n+1)-fold full belief in caution.
//
We also need a mapping from epistemic models with incom-
plete information to those with complete information. Con-
sider a finite 2-person static game Γ = (Ci, ui)i∈I , the corre-
sponding game form G = (Ci)i∈I , and a finite epistemic model
Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I for G with incomplete information. We
construct a modelMco = (Ti, bi)i∈I for Γwith complete informa-
tion as follows. For each θi ∈ Θi, we define Ei(θi) = {θ
′
i
∈ Θi :
βi(θ
′
i
) = β(θi)}. In this way Θi is partitioned into some equiv-
alence classes Ei = {Ei1, ..., EiL} where for each ℓ = 1, .., L,
Eiℓ = Ei(θi) for some θi ∈ Θi. To each Ei ∈ Ei we use ti(Ei)
to represent a type. We define bi(ti(Ei)) to be a lexicographic
belief which is obtained from βi(θi) by replacing each occur-
rence of (c j, θ j) by (c j, t j(E j(θ j))); in other words, bi(ti(Ei)) has
the same distribution on choices at each level as βi(θi) for each
θi ∈ Ei, while each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) is replaced by t j(E j(θ j)). For
each i ∈ I, let Ti = {ti(Ei)}Ei∈Ei . We have constructed from M
in
a finite epistemic model Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I with complete infor-
mation for Γ.
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It can be seen that this is the reversion of the previous con-
struction. That is, let Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I satisfying that bi(ti) ,
bi(t
′
i
) for each ti, t
′
i
∈ Ti with ti , t
′
i
, and Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I
be constructed from Mco by the previous two steps. Then
Ei = {Θi(ti)}ti∈Ti and ti(Θi(ti)) = ti for each i ∈ I.
In the following example we show how this construction
goes.
Example 3.3. Consider the game Γ in Example 3.2 and the
model Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I for the corresponding game form
where Θ1 = {θ11, θ12}, Θ2 = {θ21, θ22}, and
w1(θ11) = u1, β1(θ11) = ((D, θ21), (C, θ22)),
w1(θ12) = v1, β1(θ12) = ((D, θ21), (C, θ22)),
w2(θ21) = u2, β2(θ21) = ((A, θ11), (B, θ12)),
w2(θ22) = v2, β2(θ22) = ((A, θ11), (B, θ12)).
where v1 = v12(t1) and v2 = v22(t2) in Example 3.2. It can
be seen that E1 = {{θ11, θ12}} since β1(θ11) = β1(θ12) and
E2 = {{θ21, θ22}} since β2(θ21) = β2(θ22).Corresponding to those
equivalence classes we have t1({θ11, θ12}) and t2({θ21, θ22}), and
b1(t1({θ11, θ12})) = ((D, t2({θ21, θ22})), (C, t2({θ21, θ22}))),
b2(t2({θ21, θ22})) = ((A, t1({θ11, θ12})), (B, t1({θ11, θ12}))).
We have the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.2 (Cautionin → Cautionco). Let Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I
and Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I be constructed from M
in by the above
approach. If θi ∈ Θi expresses common full belief in caution,
so does ti(Ei(θi)).
Proof. We show this statement by induction. First we show
that if θi is cautious, then ti(Ei(θi)) is also cautious. Let c j ∈ C j
and t j ∈ T j(ti(Ei(θi))). By construction, t j = t j(E j) for some
E j ∈ E j, and there is some θ j ∈ E j which is deemed possible
by θi. Since θi is cautious, there is some θ
′
j
with β j(θ
′
j
) = β j(θ j),
i.e., θ′
j
∈ E j, such that (c j, θ
′
j
) is deemed possible by θi. By
construction, (c j, t j) is deemed possible by ti(Ei(θi)).
Suppose we have shown that, for each i ∈ I, if θi expresses
n-fold full belief in caution then so does ti(Ei(θi)). Now sup-
pose that θi expresses (n + 1)-fold full belief in caution, i.e.,
each θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) expresses n-fold full belief in caution. Since,
by construction, for each t j ∈ T j(ti(Ei(θi))), there is some
θ j ∈ Θ j(θi) such that t j = t j(E j(θ j)), by inductive assumption
t j expresses n-fold full belief in caution. Therefore, ti(Ei(θi))
expresses (n + 1)-fold full belief in caution. //
Lemma 3.3 (Assumption of rationality ←→ every good
choice is supportedprior + belief in u ). Let Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I
and Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I be constructed from M
co. If ti ∈ Ti ex-
presses common assumption of rationality, then each θi ∈ Θi(ti)
expresses common full belief in that every good choice is sup-
ported and prior belief in u.
On the other hand, let Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I and M
co =
(Ti, bi)i∈I be constructed from M
in. If θi ∈ Θi expresses com-
mon full belief in that every good choice is supported and prior
belief in u, then ti(Ei(θi)) expresses common full assumption of
rationality.
Proof. We show this statement by induction. Let θi ∈ Θi(ti).
First we show that if ti assumes in j’s rationality, θi believes
that every good choice is supported and prior belief in u. Let
c j ∈ C j be optimal for some cautious type of j whose assigned
utility function is u j within an epistemic model with incomplete
information. It is easy to see that c j is optimal for its corre-
sponding type, which is also cautious by Lemma 3.2, in any
complete information model constructed from the one with in-
complete information by our approach above. Since ti assumes
j’s rationality, ti deems possible a cautious type t j for which c j
is optimal. By construction, some θ j ∈ Θ j(t j) is deemed possi-
ble by θi. Since ti is cautious, (c j, t j) is deemed possible by ti,
and, by construction (c j, θ j1(t j)) is deemed possible by θi. Since
w j(θ j1(t j)) = u j and c j is optimal for θ j1(t j), it follows that θi
believes in that every good choice is supported.
Let (c j, θ j) with θ j cautious deemed possible by θi satisfying
w j(θ j) = u j and (c
′
j
, θ′
j
) a pair which does not satisfy that condi-
tion. Let (c j, t j) and (c
′
j
, t′
j
) be the pairs occuring in the belief of
ti corresponding to (c j, θ j) and (c
′
j
, θ′
j
). Since c j is rational to θ j
and w j(θ j) = u j, it follows that c j is optimal for t j. On the other
hand, c′
j
is not optimal for t′
j
. Since ti assumes j’s rationality,
ti deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j
, t′
j
). By construc-
tion, θi deems (c j, θ j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j
, θ′
j
). Here
we have shown that θi priorly believes in u.
Now we show the other direction: suppose that if θi ∈ Θi
believes in that every good choice is supported and priorly be-
lieves in u, we prove that ti(Ei(θi)) assumes j’s rationality. Sup-
pose that c j is optimal for some cautious type within some epis-
temic model with complete information. It can be seen by con-
struction that c j is optimal for some cautious type with ui as
its assigned utility function within some epistemic model with
incomplete information which corresponds to that complete in-
formation model. Since θi believes in that every good choice
is supported, θi deems possible a cautious type θ j such that
w j(θ j) = u j and c j is optimal for θ j. By construction it follows
that ti(Ei(θi)) deems t j(E j(θ j)) possible for which c j is optimal.
Let (c j, t j) with t j cautious be a pair which is deemed possi-
ble by ti(Ei(θi)) satisfying that c j is optimal for t j, and (c
′
j
, t′
j
) be
a pair deemed possible by ti(Ei(θi)) which does not satisfy that
condition. Let (c j, θ j) and (c
′
j
, θ′
j
) be the corresponding pairs
occuring in the belief of θi. Since θi believes in rationality, by
construction it follows that u j(θ j) = u j while u j(θ
′
j
) , u j. Since
θi priorly believes in u, θi deems (c j, θ j) infinitely more likely
than (c′
j
, θ′
j
). It follows that ti(Ei(θi)) deems (c j, t j) infinitely
more likely than (c′
j
, t′
j
). Here we have shown that ti(Ei(θi)) as-
sumes j’s rationality.
Suppose that, for some n ∈ N, we have shown that for each
k ≤ n,
(n1) if ti ∈ Ti expresses k-fold assumption of rationality, then
each θi ∈ Θi(ti) expresses k-fold full belief in that every good
choice is supported and prior belief in u;
(n2) If θi ∈ Θi expresses k-fold full belief in that every good
choice is supported and prior belief in u, then ti(Ei(θi)) ex-
presses k-fold assumption of rationality.
Now we show that these two statements hold for n + 1. First,
suppose that ti ∈ Ti expresses (n + 1)-fold assumption of ratio-
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nality. Let c j ∈ C j be a choice of j optimal for some cautious
type whose assigned utility function is u j that expresses up to
n-fold belief in that every good choice is supported. Then it is
easy to see that (1) by inductive assumption, in the constructed
complete information model the corresponding type expresses
n-fold assumption of rationality, and (2) c j is optimal for that
type. Since ti expresses (n + 1)-fold assumption of rationality,
ti deems possible a cautious type t j that expresses up to n-fold
assumption of rationality and for which c j is optimal. By con-
struction, it follows that θi deems possible some θ j ∈ Θ j(t j). By
inductive assumption it follows that each θ j ∈ Θ j(t j) expresses
n-fold belief in that every good choice is supported. Since θi
expresses common belief in caution and rationality it follows
that θi deems (c j, θ j1) for θ j1 ∈ Θ j(t j) (that is, w j(θ j1) = u j).
Let (c j, θ j) with θ j cautious deemed possible by θi satisfying
that θ j expresses up tp n-fold belief in prior belief in u and that
every good choice is supported and w j(θ j) = u j and (c
′
j
, θ′
j
) a
pair which does not satisfy those conditions. Let (c j, t j) and
(c′
j
, t′
j
) be the pairs occuring in the belief of ti corresponding to
(c j, θ j) and (c
′
j
, θ′
j
). Since c j is rational for θ j and w j(θ j) = u j, it
follows that c j is optimal for t j. Also, by inductive assumption,
it follows that t j expresses up to n-fold assumption of rational-
ity. On the other hand, it can be seen that (c′
j
, t′
j
) does not satisfy
these conditions. Since ti expresses (n + 1)-fold of assump-
tions of rationality, ti deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely than
(c′
j
, t′
j
). By construction, θi deems (c j, θ j) infinitely more likely
than (c′
j
, θ′
j
). Here we have shown that θi expresses (n + 1)-fold
full belief in that every good choice is supported and prior belief
in u.
Now suppose that θi ∈ Θi expresses (n + 1)-fold full belief
in that every good choice is supported and prior belief in u.
Let c j ∈ C j be a choice of j optimal for some cautious type
that expresses to n-fold assumption of rationality. By inductive
assumption it follows that the corresponding type within some
incomplete information model also expresses n-fold full belief
in that every good choice is supported and prior belief in u. It
can be seen that c j is optimal to the constructed type having
u j as its utility functionand the type expresses up to n-fold full
belief in that every good choice is supported and prior belief in
u. Then θi deems possible a type θ j with w j(θ j) = u j for player
j which expresses up to n-fold belief in that every good choice
is supported for which c j is optimal. By inductive assumption it
follows that ti(Ei(θi)) deems possible t j(E j(θ j)) which expresses
n-fold assumption of rationality and for which c j is optimal.
Let (c j, t j) be a pair with t j cautious deemed possible by
ti(Ei(θi)) where t j expresses up to n-fold assumption of rational-
ity and c j is optimal for t j, and let (c
′
j
, t′
j
) be a pair that does not
satisfy this property. Let (c j, θ j) and (c
′
j
, θ′
j
) be the correspond-
ing pairs occurring in the belief of θi. By inductive assumption
and by construction, θ j is cautious and expresses up to n-fold
belief in that prior belief in u and every good choice is supported
and w j(θ j) = u j, while (c
′
j
, θ′
j
) does not satisfy this property.
Therefore θi deems (c j, θ j) infinitely more likely than (c
′
j
, θ′
j
),
which implies that ti(Ei(θi)) deems (c j, t j) infinitely more likely
than (c′
j
, t′
j
).Here we have shown that ti(Ei(θi)) expresses (n+1)-
fold assumption of rationality. //
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (Only-if) Let Mco = (Ti, bi)i∈I , M
in =
(Θi,wi, βi)i∈I be constructed from M
co by the two steps above,
c∗
i
∈ Ci be a permissible choice, and t
∗
i
∈ Ti be a type express-
ing common full belief in caution and common assumption of
rationality such that c∗
i
is rational for t∗
i
. Let θ∗
i
= θi1(t
∗
i
). By def-
inition, wi(θ
∗
i
) = ui and βi(θ
∗
i
) has the same distribution on j’s
choices at each level as bi(t
∗
i
). Hence c∗
i
is rational for θ∗
i
. Also,
it follows from Observation 3.2, Lemmas 3.1, and 3.3 that θ∗
i
expresses common full belief in caution, rationality,that a good
choice is supported, and prior belief in u.
(If). Let Min = (Θi,wi, βi)i∈I , M
co = (Ti, bi)i∈I be constructed
from Min by the above approach, and c∗
i
∈ Ci be rational for
some θ∗
i
with wi(θ
∗
i
) = ui which expresses common full be-
lief in caution, rationality, that a good choice is supported, and
prior belief in u. Consider ti(Ei(θ
∗
i
)). Since wi(θ
∗
i
) = ui and
bi(ti(Ei(θ
∗
i
))) has the same distribution on j’s choices at each
level as βi(θ
∗
i
), c∗
i
is rational for ti(Ei(θ
∗
i
)). Also, by Lemmas 3.2
and 3.3, ti(Ei(θ
∗
i
)) expresses common full belief in caution and
common assumption of rationality. //
4. Concluding Remarks
Assumption of rationality is a refinement of permissibility
(See Perea Perea (2012)). This can also be seen within the
framework of incomplete information. Comparing our charac-
terization of the former of the characterization of the latter in
Section 4.6 in Liu Liu (2017) it can be seen that there is cor-
respondence between the conditions. Section 4.6 in Liu Liu
(2017) characterizes permissibility by weak caution, rational-
ity, and primary belief in u within the incomplete information
framework. The characteization of assumption of rationality
shares rationality with it, while caution and prior belief are
stronger than weak caution and primary belief in u, respectively.
An interesting phenomenon is the role of rationality. Liu
Liu (2017) provides two ways to characterize permissibility,
one with rationality and one without it. The characterization of
proper rationality there is a stronger version of the latter, while
the characterization in this paper a stronger version of the for-
mer. So far, it seems that using or not using rationality in the
characterization differentiate the two refinements of permissi-
bility, that is, assumption of rationality and proper rationaliz-
ability, within the incomplete information framework. It would
be interesting that any future research would confirm this state-
ment or provide any counterexample, that is, show that proper
rationalizability can be characterized with rationality while as-
sumption of rationality can be done without it.
On the other hand, as shown in Liu Liu (2017) (and the
construction here), it is always possible to construct epistemic
models with incomplete information which satisfies rationality
as well as all conditions for characterization of proper ratio-
nalizability. Further, prior belief in u is voguely a condition
between primary belief in u and u-centered belief which is used
in Theorem 3.2 of Liu Liu (2017) to characterize proper ratio-
nalizability. Those seem to correspond to the fact within the
complete information framework that there is always possible
to construct belief hierarchywhich both assumes the opponent’s
rationality and respects the opponent’s preferences.
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